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The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and that moral 
behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has led several of its supporters to 
infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary to what has been 
traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall challenge this inference. My purpose in 
doing so is to expose and acknowledge something that has been inadequately appre-
ciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral goods and evils. I hope thereby to show 
that, even if immorality can be admirable (and morality less than admirable), this poses 
no threat to morality. 
The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and 
that moral behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has 
recently received a good deal of attention. Some have supported this 
idea, others have rejected it. The idea has led several of its supporters 
to infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary 
to what has been traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall chal-
lenge this inference. My purpose in doing so is not to salvage either the 
claim that immorality can be admirable (and morality less than 
admirable) or the claim that moral considerations are always over-
riding. On the contrary, I am unsure about the former and have serious 
reservations about the latter, for reasons that I shall try to make clear. 
My purpose, rather, is to expose and acknowledge something that has 
been inadequately appreciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral 
goods and evils. In so doing I hope to show that, even if immorality can 
be admirable (and morality less than admirable), this poses no threat 
to morality. There is no paradox lurking here, nor is morality to be 
relegated to a position that is somehow inferior to that which it is 
traditionally thought to occupy. 
I. WHAT ADMIRABLE IMMORALITY AND 
NONADMIRABLE MORALITY ARE 
(OR ARE SUPPOSED TO BE) 
There are many illustrations in the recent literature of behaviour that 
is alleged to be at once both admirable and immoral. Probably the best-
known and -worn illustration is that provided by Bernard Williams of 
Gauguin, who abandoned his family in his pursuit of artistic excel-
lence.! Susan Wolf has presented a variety of cases in a similar vein, 
1 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 22 ff. 
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where people engage in artistic or otherwise creative endeavours at 
the expense of seeing to the welfare of others who are in need.2 Michael 
Slote has also presented both cases of this sort and cases where the 
devotion in question is directed to other types of goals, such as seeing 
to the needs of one's family or one's country, but still at the expense of, 
rather than in the service of, doing what is morally right.3 And others 
have discussed yet other cases. 
Illustrations similarly abound of behaviour that is alleged to be 
at once both moral and nonadmirable (perhaps even regrettable or 
reprehensible).4 Michael Stocker has provided the case of someone who 
visits an acquaintance in hospital not so much out of friendship as out 
of a sense of duty.5 Similarly, Williams has noted that a wife in peril 
may well hope that her husband rescues her simply because she is his 
wife, and not (also) because it is morally permissible for him to do SO.6 
Wolfhas discussed at length the deficiencies of persons whom she calls 
'moral saints' - persons 'whose every action is as morally good as poss-
ible' and whose lives are, as a result, 'strangely barren'.7 And, again, 
others have discussed yet other cases. 
In all cases of the sorts just mentioned there is allegedly a diver-
gence of the admirable and the moral. But precisely what sort of 
divergence is at issue? Slote has drawn a much-discussed distinction 
between three theses concerning admirable immorality.8 He calls the 
first of these the strong thesis, and it can be rendered as follows: 
(ST) Immoral behaviour as such is sometimes admirable. 
The second he calls the weak thesis, and it can be rendered as 
follows: 
(WT) Certain aspects of immoral actions are sometimes admirable, 
and certain traits of persons that make them more likely to act 
wrongly are sometimes admirable. 
In presenting (ST) and (WT) in this way, I have followed closely Slote's 
own rendition of them. He is not so explicit when it comes to the third 
thesis, which he calls the intermediate thesis, but it is fairly clear that 
the following is what he has in mind: 
2 Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy, lxxix (1982),420 fT. 
3 Michael Slate, Goods and Virtues, Oxford, 1983, pp. 80 ff. 
• I prefer the terms 'regrettable' and 'reprehensible' to the term 'repugnant', which is 
sometimes used in this context. The suffixes '-able' and '-ible' indicate that what is at 
issue is the worthiness of a certain attitude, whether or not that attitude is in fact taken 
by anyone. 
5 Michael Stocker, 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories', Journal of 
Philosophy, lxxiii (1976), 462. 
6 Williams, p. 18. 
7 Wolf, 419 and 421. 
8 Slate, p. 79. 
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(IT) Certain aspects of immoral actions that are intrinsically con-
nected with their immorality are sometimes admirable, and 
certain traits of persons that are intrinsically connected with 
making them more likely to act wrongly are sometimes admir-
able. 
Instead of the term 'are intrinsically connected with', Slote occasion-
ally uses the terms 'cannot be conceptually prised from' and 'are not 
merely externally related to'.9 
It is on the intermediate thesis that Slote and his commentators 
have tended to focus. This is because they regard the strong thesis 
as rather obviously false and the weak thesis as rather obviously 
true. to The strong thesis would appeal, Slote says, only to those of a 
Nietzschean bent, who regard morality as either pathological or de-
generate. The weak thesis, on the other hand, is continually confirmed 
in everyday life, as when a bank robbery is executed with daring or, 
perhaps, a safe is cracked with skill. But it seems to me that this move 
to the middle is premature, for as they stand none of the three theses 
is especially clear. 
First, the use of 'sometimes' is puzzling. It suggests 'sometimes 
and only sometimes'. But how, for example, could immoral behaviour 
as such be sometimes but only sometimes admirable? Or how could 
a certain trait (as such, that is, in and of itself) be sometimes but 
only sometimes admirable? It might of course be that a trait when 
manifested in certain circumstances C is admirable, whereas when 
manifested in certain other circumstances C' it is not. But this would 
not imply that the trait in and of itself is sometimes admirable and 
sometimes not. On the contrary, the explanation must be either that 
the trait is admirable in and of itself, but its aclmirability is somehow 
overridden (whether simply counterbalanced or otherwise defeated) 
by other features of circumstances C' (though not overridden by any 
features of circumstances C); or that the trait is not admirable in and 
of itself, but the trait-cum-C is (although the trait-cum-C' is not).l1 I 
propose that henceforth we eschew such talk of ' sometimes'. 
Secondly, both 'aspects' of actions and traits of persons are said to 
be such that they may be admirable. But what sort of aspects are at 
issue? The example of a daring robbery suggests that the aspect in 
question is simply the manifestation of a certain personal trait. After 
9 Ibid., pp. 84, 79 and 80 respectively. 
10 See, e.g., Slote, p. 79; Owen Flanagan, 'Admirable Immorality and Admirable Im-
perfection', Journal of Philosophy, lxxxiii (1986), 42. 
11 In putting matters thus, I am opposing the sort of particularism espoused by 
Jonathan Dancy in Moral Reasons, Oxford, 1993. There is no space to elaborate on this 
here. 
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all, it is robbers who dare, not robberies. I propose, therefore, that we 
focus on (allegedly) admirable traits of persons. (There is, of course, a 
distinction between the possession and the manifestation of a trait, 
and each might be said to be admirable in its own right. I hope it is 
acceptable to ignore this subtlety here. I shall be focusing on cases 
where traits are manifested in action but shall leave unsettled whether 
it is the mere possession of the traits or their manifestation whose 
admirability is in question.) 
Thirdly, the strong thesis mentions 'behaviour' whereas the others 
mention 'actions'. Sometimes the latter term is construed more nar-
rowly than the former, but I think that in this context it ought not to 
be. 
Finally, there is talk of actions' being 'immoral' and of their being 
'wrong'. On some views, actions are properly called immoral only if 
they stem from some morally bad motive (or otherwise manifest some 
morally bad trait) and hence are themselves morally bad, whereas 
actions can be wrong even when well motivated and hence morally 
good. Presumably some motivational deficiency is at issue in the three 
theses. They do not concern actions that 'just happen' to be wrong (if 
this is possible); they concern actions that are morally bad, actions 
that reflect ill on the agent. This, of course, is the source of the alleged 
tension. How can it be that an agent's actions both manifest an admir-
able trait and yet reflect ill on him or her? 
I propose, therefore, that we concern ourselves with the following 
theses: 
(ST1) The moral badness of morally bad actions is admirable in and 
of itself. 
(WT1) Certain traits that are sometimes manifested in morally bad 
actions are admirable in and of themselves. 
(lTl) Certain traits that are sometimes manifested in morally bad 
actions and are intrinsically connected with their moral bad-
ness are admirable in and of themselves. 
I think we should agree that (STl) is false. But what about the 
others? 
I would think that (WT1) is pretty clearly true, if the admixture 
of morally good with morally bad motives or traits is possible and is 
supposed to be covered by this thesis. If, for example, sympathy is a 
morally good motive and jealousy a morally bad one, and if it is poss-
ible that I perform some act both out of sympathy and out of jealousy, 
then my act may perhaps be properly said to be morally bad (especially 
if the jealousy in some sense predominates); yet the sympathy would 
seem to be admirable. But even if such admixture is not admitted, I 
would think that (WT1) is pretty clearly true. The example of a daring 
robbery would seem to suffice here. The robbery may be ill motivated, 
Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved.
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and hence morally bad, and yet the daring with which it is executed 
would seem admirable, even if not morally good.12 
Whether (lTl) should be accepted depends on just what is meant by 
'intrinsically connected with'. In her advocacy of unsaintly behaviour, 
Wolf stresses the fact that, the world being as it is, one cannot play the 
oboe or improve one's backhand while striving to do all that is within 
one's power to fight famine and disease.13 But this is presumably 
not sufficient for the sort of connection between admirability and 
(im)morality that Slote has in mind, since this incompatibility be-
tween admirable and morally good behaviour is merely practical 
rather than conceptual. Slote emphasizes devotion to a cause which 
precludes morally good behaviour because he is impressed by the 
'single-mindedness' of such an attitude. It is not simply that, the world 
being as it is, such devotion precludes such behaviour; for we can 
imagine a more fortunate world in which the devotion and the be-
haviour are compatible. I take Slote's point to be that, even in a more 
fortunate world of this sort, genuine devotion to the sort of cause he 
has in mind essentially involves a preparedness to cast aside moral 
considerations, should circumstances so warrant.14 Such preparedness 
is a conceptual mark of the single-mindedness with which he is con-
cerned. Once this is understood, though, I think it is not at all obvious 
that the intermediate thesis is true. This is an issue to which I shall 
return in section III. 
Corresponding to the three theses concerning admirable immorality, 
the following three theses concerning non admirable morality may be 
distinguished: 
(ST2) The moral goodness of morally good actions is nonadmirable 
in and of itself. 
(WT2) Certain traits that are sometimes manifested in morally good 
actions are nonadmirable in and of themselves. 
(IT2) Certain traits that are sometimes manifested in morally good 
actions and are intrinsically connected with their moral good-
ness are nonadmirable in and of themselves. 
As with their counterparts, (ST2) seems clearly false and (WT2) pretty 
clearly true, while (lT2) may seem more problematic. We might wish 
to agree with Wolf that many nonmoral traits are admirable without 
agreeing that a devotion to duty must involve nonadmirable behav-
iour. Again, I shall return to this in section III below. 
12 Not everyone will agree with this claim, of course. One recent example of someone 
who would apparently reject it is Judith Jarvis Thomson in 'The Right and the Good', 
Journal of Philosophy , xciv (1997), 285. 
13 Wolf, 421. 
.. Compare the emphasis placed on the tendency to act immorally in Richard McCarty, 
'Are There "Contra-Moral Virtues"?', Metaphilosophy, xxv (1994),364 f. 
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II. PERSONAL VS. INTRINSIC VS. MORAL GOODS 
AND EVILS 
It is important to recognize that the good and bad traits involved 
in moral and immoral actions are of course morally good and bad, 
respectively, since there are other types of goods and evils. Two other 
types worth brief consideration are personal and intrinsic goods and 
evils. 
Consider personal goods and evils. A man's sadistic pleasures may 
be properly said to be good-for-him, even if they are neither intrin-
sically nor morally good. As Slote observes: 
[lIt would be senseless ... to argue that sadistic pleasures are not personal 
goods because no disinterested being would wish them to exist, because it is 
not intrinsically good that they should exist. A disinterested being might also 
disapprove of a vicious man's being happy, but it hardly follows that the vicious 
man is not well off. And we have no more reason on that score to deny that 
sadistic pleasures are personal goods. 15 
Consider a man who is devoted to the pursuit of his own sadistic 
pleasures. Acting accordingly, he manifests a trait that is both intrin-
sically connected with something that is personally good and is non-
admirable; but this clearly does not support (IT2), since that thesis 
concerns what is morally rather than personally good. Similarly, 
physical pain is a personal evil, but a preparedness to endure such 
pain for the sake of others, while admirable, does not support (ITl), 
since that thesis concerns what is morally rather than personally bad. 
Intrinsic goods and evils are more closely connected to moral goods 
and evils than personal goods and evils are. But still there is a dis-
tinction to be drawn, for, while I suppose it to be true that all moral 
goods and evils are intrinsic goods and evils, respectively, the reverse 
is false. (This is an important point to which I shall return in section 
V.) Almost everyone will agree that physical pain (or, at least, un-
deserved physical pain) is intrinsically bad, but it is properly classified 
not as a moral evil but as something else (a 'natural' evil, perhaps). So 
too, many pleasures (of a certain restricted sort, perhaps) are plausibly 
regarded as intrinsically good, but not as morally good. This being the 
case, even if there is reason to think that certain analogues to (ITl) 
and (IT2) having to do with intrinsic value are true, this may not pro-
vide confirmation of (IT 1) and (IT2) themselves. For example, devotion 
to the pursuit of one's own perfectly innocent pleasures does not sup-
port (IT2), nor does a preparedness to endure undeserved physical 
pain for the sake of others support (IT!). 
15 Slote, pp. 127 f. 
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III. ARE THE INTERMEDIATE THESES TRUE? 
In principle, any illustration that is offered as confirmation of (IT!) 
can be challenged in one of three ways. It may be claimed that the 
behaviour in question is not admirable, or that it is not immoral, or 
that its admirability is not intrinsically connected with its immorality. 
It is exactly such challenges that some of Slote's commentators have 
made. For example, Owen Flanagan has noted that many will find 
nothing admirable in Gauguin's behaviour (although they may be 
quite willing to declare artistic passion that is moderated by moral 
sensitivity admirable), that others will find nothing immoral in it, and 
that still others will deny the requisite intrinsic connection.16 Indeed, 
he himself pursues the third course,17 as does Marcia Baron, who also 
pursues the first, arguing that which type of challenge applies to the 
case of Gauguin and other such cases depends on just how these cases 
are to be construed.18 
Since it is hard to see how such challenges might be definitively 
settled, I think it must be agreed that the truth of (IT!) remains an 
open question. Similar remarks pertain to (IT2), which is in principle 
open to three analogous challenges, although there is this compli-
cation: nonadmirability can come in various forms. Note first that 
'nonadmirable' might simply mean the same as 'not worthy of being 
admired', or it might mean the same as 'worthy of not being admired'. 
I think that, where nonadmirable morality has been diagnosed, it is 
typically the latter interpretation - at least - that has been intended. 
I say 'at least' because there are of course still stronger forms of non-
admirability. Something might be nonadmirable because it is regret-
table, or even reprehensible. It is clear that some have found morally 
good behaviour on occasion regrettable. Wolf, for example, indicates 
this when she notes that a moral saint lacks, indeed must lack (there-
by satisfying Slote's condition concerning intrinsic connectedness), a 
cynical or sarcastic wit. 19 It is doubtful, though, that she would find 
the absence of such a wit reprehensible. (Other behaviour that may 
be exhibited by moral saints - such as their acting in a 'dull-witted or 
humorless or bland' manner 20 - she would perhaps find reprehensible, 
but I do not think that she would insist that a moral saint must exhibit 
such behaviour.) 21 The difference between 'regrettable' and 'reprehen-
16 Flanagan, 43 f. 
17 Ibid., 44 tr. 
18 Marcia Baron, 'On Admirable Immorality', Ethics, xcvi (1986), 563 ff. 
19 Wolf, 422. 
20 Ibid. 
21 That moral saints need not exhibit such behaviour has recently been forcefully 
argued by Tracy Isaacs and Diane Jeske in 'Moral Deliberation, Nonmoral Ends, and the 
Virtuous Agent', Ethics, cvii (1997). . 
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sible' seems to be this: the mere absence of something good is arguably 
regrettable but not reprehensible; reprehension, to be warranted, 
requires the presence of something bad.22 
There are, then, at least three versions of (IT2) that can be dis-
tinguished. First there is (IT2) as stated (with 'nonadmirable' under-
stood in terms of 'worthy of not being admired'). Then there is a 
stronger version - call it (IT2+) - where 'nonadmirable' is replaced by 
'regrettable'. Then there is a still stronger version - call it (lT2++) -
where 'nonadmirable' is replaced by 'reprehensible'. Once these ver-
sions are distinguished, I think it is clear that (IT2) itself is a fairly 
weak thesis and one that is pretty plausible. After all, even if devotion 
to duty is admirable, it is plausible to claim that it cannot be exhibited 
without something else's being exhibited that would seem worthy of 
indifference; for example, it cannot be exhibited without the agent's 
also exhibiting agency. (lT2++), on the other hand, is really quite 
strong, and it is not clear that anyone has sought to champion it.23 In 
between, of course, lies (IT2+), which clearly has been advocated by 
some and concerning which there are, I suspect, differences of opinion 
whose definitive resolution would appear as elusive as the resolution 
of those concerning (ITI). 
IV. WHO NEEDS THE INTERMEDIATE THESES ANYWAY? 
I have been concerned with the intermediate theses (lTI) and (IT2) 
(and strengthened versions of the latter) because it is they in par-
ticular that have been invoked in the case that some have made 
against the claim that moral considerations are always overriding. 
The suggestion seems to be that the weak theses (WTI) and (WT2) are 
not strong enough to make this case. (Slote even says that (WTI) does 
not involve something that we would want to call 'admirable im-
morality' at a1L)24 But it seems to me that this emphasis on the 
intermediate theses is misplaced. If these theses give good reason to 
reject the overridingness thesis, then so too do the weak theses. And 
the truth of the weak theses is not in contention, even if that of the 
intermediate theses is. 
My point is this. The simple fact that some nonmoral traits are 
admirable may seem to indicate the nonsupremacy of moral consider-
22 See Wolf, 435. 
23 This having been said, there is perhaps a reason for affirming (IT2++) that, as far 
as I know, has not been discussed by those who have been concerned with the possibility 
of non admirable morality. This reason has to do with resisting the temptation to do evil. 
Such resistance seems to be morally good, and yet it cannot occur in the absence of such 
temptation, which itself seems reprehensible. 
24 Slote, p. 79. 
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ations. Slote suggests that Gauguin's immoral action, whose admir-
ability is allegedly intrinsically connected with its immorality, is 
somehow preferable to his acting morally would have been, and that 
this shows the overridingness thesis false. But why should some of 
Wolf's cases not be thought to have equal force, even if the connection 
between admirable traits and immoral behaviour is in these cases 
found to be merely practically unavoidable rather than conceptually 
undeniable? Even if it is merely the world as it is that renders it 
impossible for someone to be both a moral saint and a gourmet cook,25 
if it is nonetheless thought desirable that some people sometimes 
engage in such culinary pursuits rather than act morally, is this not 
enough to establish Wolf's claim that 'morality should not serve as a 
comprehensive guide to conduct'?26 So who needs the intermediate 
theses anyway? 
At this point we need to inquire into the basic question as to how it 
is that nonmoral traits can be admirable. 
V. THE MORAL ASPECT OF NONMORAL GOODS 
AND EVILS 
It is a commonplace that there are both moral and nonmoral virtues 
(and vices). Frequently cited as moral virtues are such traits as com-
passion, courage, and conscientiousness, and as nonmoral virtues such 
traits as intelligence, wit, and aesthetic sensitivity. Whether moral or 
nonmoral, a virtue (or vice) is taken somehow to reflect well (or ill) on 
its possessor; just how it does this will of course depend on just what 
the trait in question is. And it is not just virtues (and vices) that reflect 
well (and ill) on their possessors. Only a courageous person, I suppose, 
can exhibit the virtue of courage; for virtues, whatever they are exactly, 
are traits that are relatively well entrenched and 10ng-standing.27 But 
someone who is not a courageous person can nonetheless show courage 
on occasion, and such behaviour will still reflect well on him or her. 
Since this is so, let us say (although this perhaps stretches normal 
usage somewhat) that, even in the case of an uncharacteristic display 
of courage, the agent manifests the trait (even if not the virtue) of 
courage. Then our lists of moral and nonmoral virtues (and vices) can 
be treated as lists of moral and nonmoral traits generally that reflect 
well (and ill) on their possessors. 
Now here is a central truth. Whenever a trait is displayed that 
reflects well (or ill) on its possessor, that trait is admirable (or repre-
25 See Wolf, 422. 
26 Ibid., 434. 
27 See James D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices, Ithaca, 1978, ch. 2. 
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hensible) - and so is its agent (to that extent, at least, and on that 
occasion) - regardless of whether the trait is moral or nonmoral, and 
even ifCifthis is possible) the trait has some sort of intrinsic connection 
with morally bad (or good) behaviour. It is of course precisely this fact 
that some have seen to pose some sort ofthreat to morality. 
To say that a trait is admirable (or reprehensible) is to say that it is 
worthy of admiration (or reprehension), that it is fitting or appropriate 
to admire (or reprehend) it. This notion of fittingness has an im-
pressive pedigree. It played a large role in the moral theories of several 
eighteenth-century British philosophers28 and has since been resur-
rected by, among others, Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm, 
although the former tends to talk of the 'correctness' of certain atti-
tudes while the latter tends to talk of certain attitudes being 're-
quired'.29 Fittingness is a relation that is not restricted to attitudes and 
their objects; its extension is much wider. As illustrations of one thing 
requiring another, Chisholm gives the following: ' ... promise-making 
requires - or calls for - promise-keeping; being virtuous requires '" 
being rewarded; the dominant seventh requires the chord of the tonic; 
one color in the lower left calls for a complementary color in the upper 
right'. 30 
Here, though, we should draw a distinction that Chisholm fails to 
draw (although others have drawn it31), and that is between ethical or 
moral requirement and other types of requirement. Ifpromise-making 
requires promise-keeping, this is a moral matter, whereas, if one 
colour calls for another that is complementary rather than incon-
gruous, that is a matter of aesthetics.32 It is, after all, unlikely that 
promise-making calls aesthetically for promise-keeping, or that one 
colour calls morally for another - unlikely, but possible, and this possi-
bility underscores rather than undermines the distinction in question. 
Consider promise-making and -keeping. If the former morally requires 
the latter, this is presumably a direct requirement; that is, it is a 
requirement that is not itself attributable to any other moral require-
ment.33 Suppose, however, that I have promised to put one colour in the 
28 Such as John Balguy, John Brown, Samuel Clarke, Richard Price and Adam Smith. 
See the selections of their and others' works edited in two volumes by L. A. Selby-Bigge 
in British Moralists, Oxford, 1897. 
29 See Franz Brentano, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, ed. Oskar 
Kraus, trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind, New York, 1969, 
p. 22; Roderick M. Chisholm, 'The Ethics of Requirement', American Philosophical 
Quarterly, i (1964). 
30 Chisholm, 147. 
3, See W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, Oxford, 1939, pp. 52 fT.; Lemos, p. 12. 
32 It may be that both moral and aesthetic requirement can be analysed in terms of 
some concept of requirement simpliciter, but I shall not pursue this here. 
33 Compare W. D. Ross on 'direct' vs. 'incidental' prima facie duties in his The Right 
and the Good, Oxford, 1930, p. 46. 
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lower left and an incongruous colour in the upper right. Then there 
will be an indirect moral requirement to do this, a requirement that 
conHicts with the aesthetic requirement not to do it. 
Other instances of moral requirement are easily given. Being a 
beneficiary, it is plausible to contend, morally requires gratitude; harm 
morally requires reparation; misfortune morally requires compassion 
- the list is long and familiar. Consider compassion. I cited this earlier 
as a trait that most would agree is morally good. I think that this is 
because it is an attitude that most would see to be morally fitting to its 
object, and it is intrinsically good when something morally fitting 
occurs. If I witness suffering and evince a morally appropriate degree 
of compassion, that is a good thing intrinsically; and it is an intrinsic 
good that is also a moral good precisely because of the moral appro-
priateness or fittingness that is involved. 
I venture to say (although this is not crucial to my purpose in this 
paper) that all moral goods are intrinsic goods that rest on moral 
fittingness in the manner just described. If promise-making morally 
requires promise-keeping, harm reparation, and so on, then it is not 
just intrinsically but morally good when what is required occurs.34 If 
this is so, then all those moral goods that consist in the possession 
or manifestation of morally good traits in particular will likewise be 
intrinsic goods that rest on moral fittingness. Compassion confirms 
this claim, as just noted. So does conscientiousness; it is morally fitting 
that one be sensitive to questions of right and wrong. So does courage; 
it is morally fitting that one display bravery in the face of danger. 
And this is precisely what distinguishes the moral from the nonmoral 
virtues. However admirable intelligence, wit, or aesthetic sensitivity 
may be, it is surely not the case that there is a moral requirement to 
display these traits (unless the requirement is indirect, as mentioned 
two paragraphs ago). 
But now notice this. Even if there is no (direct) moral requirement 
to display any of the nonmoral virtues, there is nonetheless, as has 
been acknowledged, a requirement to admire them when they are 
displayed. What sort of a requirement is this? Surely the answer is: 
moral. It is morally fitting that one admire all virtues, whether or not 
the virtues themselves are moral. Likewise, it is morally fitting that 
one reprehend all vices, whether or not the vices themselves are moral. 
This is something that is often overlooked; one must not confuse the 
sort of fittingness (if any) that a virtue might itself involve with the 
sort of fittingness involved in the admiration of the virtue. Gauguin's 
34 In saying this, I am of course not saying that it is either intrinsically or morally good 
that, for example, the harm (that requires reparation) or the misfortune (that requires 
compassion) itself occurs. 
Copyright ©2001. All Rights Reserved.
12 Michael J. Zimmerman 
artistic talent involved a certain type of aesthetic sensitivity to his 
surroundings, an attitude which, it is plausible to say, was aesthetically 
appropriate to those surroundings. Ifwe share this sensitivity, then we 
likewise display an aesthetically fitting attitude. But admiration of 
this sensitivity is one step removed from sharing it. It is an attitude 
that reveals a certain other type of sensitivity - a moral one - in the 
person who possesses it (a sensitivity which can be exhibited even 
when one does not share the aesthetic sensitivity that Gauguin dis-
played). Or consider what Slote says of Gauguin's single-mindedness: 
'[It] is ... , if anything, a morally unjustified motive or character trait, 
and any virtue we find in it, any admiration we feel for it, is pre-
dominately not ofa moral kind'.35 Again, while it can surely be agreed 
that the virtue in question (if it is such) is not a moral one and thus 
that we do not, or at least ought not to, take it to be a moral one and 
admire it as such, this does not imply that our admiration for it is not 
itself morally fitting. And it seems clear that the attitude is a morally 
fitting one (given the admirability of the trait in question). Someone 
who admires what is admirable and reprehends what is reprehensible 
is doing what is morally required of him (or her); his attitude is 
evidence of his moral rectitude. 
There is thus a moral aspect even to those nonmoral traits that 
are admirable (and reprehensible): one is morally required to admire 
(and reprehend) them. (Indeed, this aspect is twofold, for someone who 
admires what is admirable and reprehends what is reprehensible dis-
plays an attitude that is not just morally fitting but is itself admir-
able.)36 In saying this, I am not advocating a 'broadening' of morality, 
to the effect that virtues and vices that have traditionally been seen to 
be nonmoral should instead be seen to be mora1.37 On the contrary, the 
distinction between those virtues and vices that are moral and those 
that are nonmoral remains. My point is simply that even nonmoral 
goods and evils morally require certain attitudes. I said at the begin-
ning ofthis paper that this point has been inadequately appreciated; I 
mean, more precisely, that this is so in the context of the discussion of 
admirable immorality.38 Many have recognized or have come close to 
recognizing it in other contexts. For example, those (like G. E. Moore 
and W. D. Ross) who claim that there is a moral obligation to promote 
intrinsic goods and avoid intrinsic evils, even when such goods and 
35 Slote, p. 91. 
36 Compare Thomas Hurka, 'Virtue as Loving the Good', Social Philosophy, ix (1992), 
where the term 'virtue' is restricted to this trait. 
:37 Wolf rejects this move at 433 f. 
:18 There is some evidence that it has been recognized, but the evidence is at best 
inconclusive. See, e.g., Williams, p. 37 (but contrast p. 38); Wolf, 426 and 438 (but 
contrast 435 f.); McCarty. 
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evils are not themselves moral goods and evils, clearly recognize the 
moral relevance of nonmoral goods and evils. Indeed, this is in many 
ways a mundane observation, and its being so serves, I believe, to 
defuse any threat to morality, as traditionally conceived, that might 
seem to be in the offing, as I shall now try to show. 
VI. THE OVERRIDINGNESS THESIS 
It is not clear what is meant by the claim that moral considerations are 
always overriding. Perhaps one thesis that Slote and others have had 
in mind is this: 
(OT1) All morally good traits are more admirable than any non-
morally good traits. 
I think it is clear that the intermediate theses do not imply that (OT1) 
is false. After all, one can find single-mindedness in the pursuit of 
nonmoral goods admirable, or daring admirable, or culinary expertise 
admirable, while finding these things less admirable than compassion, 
courage, or conscientiousness. And this is so even if one believes these 
traits to bear some intrinsic connection with morally bad traits; 
indeed, such a connection may be thought to constitute a reason to 
embrace (OTl). Of course, if we find certain nonmoral traits (in some 
of their particular manifestations) more admirable than certain moral 
traits (in some of theirs), then we must reject (OT1); and, I believe (but 
shall not argue), we should do just this. Perhaps this is (part of) what 
Slote and others have intended. Nonetheless, it bears repeating that 
the intermediate theses themselves do not imply that (OT1) is false. 
Whether or not one rejects (OT1), it should be clear by now how it 
can happen that an agent's action should manifest an admirable (or 
nonadmirable) trait and yet reflect ill (or well) on him or her. This is 
simply due to the perfectly familiar fact that one's actions can manifest 
a number of traits, whether moral or nonmoral, some admirable, 
others not. There is perhaps a sort of tension here, but no paradox 
lurks, and there is no reason to infer that morality is somehow under 
siege. 
(OT1), however, is surely not the only thesis that someone who 
believes that moral considerations are always overriding might have 
in mind. Indeed, it does not fit talk of 'considerations' very well at all. 
Perhaps what some (including Slote) have intended is the following 
thesis, which, because it concerns choices, seems to have more to do 
with 'considerations': 
(OT2) Ifever one must choose between promoting a moral good and 
promoting a nonmoral good, one ought morally to choose the 
former. 
If (OTl) is to be rejected, it is hard to see why (OT2) should be 
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accepted. Indeed, it seems clear that (OT2) is false, and that its falsity 
is perfectly in keeping with morality as traditionally conceived. If, 
for example, one must choose between cultivating a small amount 
of compassion in someone and bringing about an immense amount of 
innocent pleasure, one ought morally, I believe, to choose the latter.39 
More to the point here, however, is that, once again, the intermediate 
theses do not imply that (OT2) is false. Ai; before, one can find single-
mindedness in the pursuit of nonmoral goods, or daring, or culinary 
expertise morally worth promoting, while finding these things less 
worth promoting than compassion, courage, or conscientiousness. 
It seems clear to me that neither ofthe two foregoing theses is what 
most people have in mind when they declare moral considerations 
overriding. For normally the discussion in this context concerns the 
justification of actions. This is certainly something that Slote and 
others have been concerned with.40 The idea seems to be that actions 
may be justified (or not) from a variety of points of view, both moral and 
nonmoral (e.g., prudential, legal, etc.). The overridingness thesis in 
question is the thesis that moral justification always takes precedence 
over nonmoral justification. That is: 
(OT3) If ever one ought morally to do some act A and ought non-
morally to do some incompatible act B, then one ought to 
do A. 
This is a puzzling thesis, for the final 'ought' is not characterized 
as being either moral or of a particular nonmoral variety. If what is 
intended by it is 'ought morally', then of course (OT3) is true, but only 
trivially so. Ifwhat is intended is 'ought prudentially (orlegally, or ... )" 
then (OT3) would seem false (although there are of course some who 
would contend - implausibly, I would have thought - that morality 
always 'pays' and hence that one ought prudentially always to do what 
one ought morally to do).41 I think typically what is intended is that the 
final 'ought' is not to be construed as of any particular variety but as 
an 'ought full stop' - a kind of all-encompassing 'ought' that transcends 
the various particular points of view. What is puzzling about this is 
that such a transcendent 'ought' would appear to presuppose that the 
various points of view, both moral and nonmoral, are in some manner 
commensurate with one another, so that the moral 'ought' can be pro-
perly deemed weightier than the rest. I find myself unable to grasp 
this alleged commensurability.42 
39 Compare Hurka, sect. 4; contrast Ross, Foundations, p. 275. 
40 See Slote, pp. 84 and 88. Compare Williams, p. 18; Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, 
Berkeley, 1978, p. 185; Wolf, 434. 
41 The view that morality always pays can be traced, in one form or another, back 
through Butler and Hobbes to Plato, if not beyond. 
42 Note that this is not just a matter of plural goods or values being commensurable, 
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It seems to me, then, that (OT3) is to be rejected, but not because 
this contrary thesis is to be accepted: 
(OT3') Sometimes, when one ought morally to do some act A but 
ought nonmorally to do some incompatible act B, one ought 
to do B. 
This thesis, too, strikes me as incoherent. But perhaps my failure to 
find (OT3) and (OT3') coherent is just a deficiency in me; perhaps they 
are perfectly coherent after all. There are certainly many people who 
claim that morality implies that (OT3) is true (and hence that (OT3') 
is false), and this view - which may, I think, be properly called a (and 
perhaps even the) traditional view of morality - obviously presupposes 
the coherence ofCOT3) and (OT3'). But even if these theses are coher-
ent, I cannot see any connection between them and the intermediate 
theses; in particular, I can see no reason to think that (IT!) implies 
(OT3'), as Slote seems to allege. For (IT1) concerns the admirability of 
certain personal traits, whereas (OT3') concerns the justifiability of 
actions. The former has to do with agent-evaluation, the latter with 
act-evaluation,43 and even if these two types of evaluation have some 
interrelation, this alleged implication surely fails. For, regardless of 
whether or not (OT3) and COT3') are in fact coherent, it is surely 
perfectly consistent to adopt the view to which I am inclined, namely, 
that certain nonmoral traits (perhaps even certain traits that have 
some intrinsic connection with immorality) are admirable (perhaps 
even more admirable than certain moral traits), and yet both (OT3) 
and (OT3') are to be rejected because they are incoherent. 
In sum, given the fact that the intermediate theses fail to imply that 
any ofthe overridingness theses identified above are false, and the fact 
that even those nonmoral goods (and evils) that are admirable (and 
reprehensible) have the moral aspect identified above, there would 
appear to be little reason to think that the phenomena of admirable 
immorality and nonadmirable morality - if, indeed, they actually 
occur - pose any sort of threat to morality as it is traditionally 
conceived.44 
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as discussed in ch. 6 of Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values, Oxford, 1990. It 
is a matter of plural types of goods or values being commensurable. (Stocker would 
rather talk of 'comparability' than of 'commensurability' in this context. I shall not 
discuss this issue here.) 
43 Ibid., p. 39 . 
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